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Abstract 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR), or the idea that companies should 
combine economic, social and environmental concerns, seems an unavoidable 
component of discourses on business and society. Why is this the case? Is it 
because we are in a post neoliberal era, and in an economic crisis, that we are 
acknowledging the drawbacks of unrestrained business activity? Or is the 
opposite true, and the popularity of CSR is the product of the triumph of 
neoliberal ideology? Both views can be supported by equally convincing 
theoretical and empirical arguments. In this paper rather than arguing for either 
view, I propose to set the problem of CSR according to a different perspective, 
which may help to move beyond narrow alternative of CSR as ‘reaction to 
neoliberalism’ or ‘as product of neoliberalism.’  
My thesis is that CSR and its concerns are much older than neoliberalism 
and post-neoliberalism. These are concerns that have to do with how to 
organize our social life, and what institutional arrangements can better promote 
justice and well-being. These concerns have to do with economy and politics at 
the same time. While many people may think that corporate social 
responsibility is empty rhetoric, I argue here that there is some substance to 
CSR, and that this substance has to do with the inextricable connection 
between economic, political and moral concerns. In the first part, I argue that 
disagreements about the nature of CSR can be addressed using the distinction 
between ‘concept’ and ‘conception.’ I identify the main understandings of CSR, 
and argue that all obscure, to varying degrees, the nuances of the relationship 
between economy and politics. In the second part, I argue that the relationship 
between politics and the market, which lies at the core of CSR, can be better 
understood if we reverse the neoclassical analogy between market and politics. 
In the third part, I address the opposition between voluntary and hard 
regulation and link this opposition to the tension between political means and 
ends. I conclude with some questions about the limitations of the label 
‘Corporate Social Responsibility.’ 
Keywords 
Market, politics, morality, liberalism, freedom, corporate social responsibility. 
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The concept of corporate social responsibility: a 
philosophical approach 1 
1 Introduction 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR), or the idea that companies should 
combine economic, social and environmental concerns, seems an unavoidable 
component of discourses on business and society. Why is this the case? Is it 
because we are in a post-neoliberal era, and in an economic crisis, that we are 
acknowledging the drawbacks of unrestrained business activity? Or is the 
opposite true, and is the popularity of CSR the product of the triumph 
neoliberal ideology? Both views can be supported by equally convincing 
theoretical and empirical arguments. 
In this paper rather than arguing for either view, I propose to set the 
problem of CSR according to a different perspective, which may help to move 
beyond narrow alternative of CSR as ‘reaction to neoliberalism’ or as product 
of neoliberalism.’ My thesis is that CSR and its concerns are much older than 
neoliberalism and post-neoliberalism. These are concerns that have to do with 
how to organize our social life and with what institutional arrangements can 
better promote justice and well-being. These concerns have to do with 
economy and politics at the same time.  
These concerns are addressed by the timeless dispute about what to leave 
to market and what should remain under direct control of the state (and its 
citizens) in order to get closer to ideals of justice and further away from 
injustice. CSR as one of the ways to interpret this dispute has to do with 
matters of morality that have always been interwoven with economic and 
political choices. 
In this paper I will suggest that rather than neoliberal or post-neoliberal 
we could think about CSR simply as liberal. Here I refer to liberalism as the 
tradition of thought that has formulated these concerns about individual and 
collective good and just institutions in their modern form. Liberalism, as John 
Gray (1986) among others reminds us, 2 is a philosophy of modernity. 
Liberalism is grounded in a modern idea of politics that subverts the 
relationship between governed and governors, between individuals and the 
state, by putting the individuals-citizens at the centre and limiting the power of 
governments over them.3 In this paper I argue that the concept of freedom 
implied by CSR is closer to the liberal idea of freedom than to the neoliberal 
one. 
                                                 
1 This paper owes much to the discussions with Patricia Almeida Ashley and the 
research group ‘Interactions between civil society and markets’ and to comments from 
Bert Helmsing and Peter Knorringa. 
2 On the modernity of liberalism see also Sheldon Wolin (1960, last edition 2006). 
3 There have been forerunners of liberalism for example in the ancient Athens of the 
sophists and Socrates, and in Rome of Cicero and the stoics. I will here refer mostly to 
the historical offspring of liberalism in seventeen century Europe and only incidentally 
to its ‘pre-history’ (Gray 1986) in classical Athens and Rome. 
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The difficulties in grasping the liberal core of CSR have to do with the 
difficulties in sharing a definition of CSR. Despite the flourishing of writing on 
the topic, CSR is still a theoretically weak field (Okoye 2009: 614). Yet 
establishing more solid foundations it essential to make use of CSR. This paper 
contributes to the quest for foundations of CSR by using the tools of political 
philosophy.  
The reason for undertaking a philosophical exploration of CSR is that I 
believe that behind the brand “CSR” there is some substance. This substance 
has to do with essential concerns of political life, crucial questions such as: how 
is it possible to combine individual happiness and justice in society? Which 
institutions are more appropriate for this purpose?  
CSR has a strong normative core. It is about how things should be—how 
to improve the impact of business on society—and not just about how things 
are. But it is important to look closer at this core, to be able to use CSR 
normative potential.  
Examining what the core of CSR includes and excludes may consist of 
conceptual investigations and empirical investigations. In this paper I develop a 
conceptual investigation that is driven by the question: what is CSR about?  
In order to answer this question I address the disagreement on CSR 
definitions and its lack of foundations as a theoretical problem that has 
important empirical implications. For some people, for example, philanthropy 
is one aspects of CSR. For others philanthropy is charity —another name and 
concept all together– and a company might be generous yet socially 
irresponsible (Almeida Ashley 2010). For some people CSR is either voluntary, 
or it is not. For others it may include governments’ interference to make 
companies socially responsible (Bredgaard 2004; Streurer 2007). But we need 
to agree at least on a general concept if we want to identify the measures of 
CSR in place, classify their types, the circumstances in which they occur, and 
finally evaluate their impact on human rights, and social and environmental 
ends. 
The conceptual investigation, which I will develop, can help to identify 
research questions and cases that mirror the controversies and different ‘souls’ 
of CSR concept. A possible research question may be: do voluntary and non-
voluntary, narrow or broad, neoliberal or left-liberal readings of CSR have to 
do with its conceptions or with its concept? Once we have removed 
conceptions of CSR that are not consistent with its core, the appropriate 
conceptions and policies of CSR may depend on circumstances, institutional 
settings, quality of hard and soft code, types of relationships between state and 
non-state actors.  
An empirical study that compares, within countries and between countries, 
companies and non- business actors that appear to interpret the concept in 
different ways may achieve two important aims. On the one hand, it may help 
to understand how interpretations of CSR differ and why. On the other hand, 
it may help establish which interpretations in each country are more successful 
in achieving economic, social and human rights aims. In this sense, the 
conceptual investigation that follows can be seen as a preparatory step to any 
empirical investigation on CSR. 
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2   Definitions and controversies 
Current ideas4 of CSR are based on the notion that companies should 
undertake tasks that are traditionally regarded as responsibilities of 
governments. Commitments to social, environmental and human rights aims 
expend the realm company responsibility to include issues outside the 
immediate economic interest of shareholders, and to address interests and 
expectations of workers, consumers, and citizens at large. 
Despite a general agreement on this ‘core’ concept of CSR, controversies 
arise when we attempt to use it to design or evaluate policies There are many 
theories of CSR and many labels are used to identify it. CSR has been 
theorised, for example, in terms of business ethics, corporate philanthropy, 
environmental sustainability, or corporate citizenship (Windsor 2006; Garriga 
and Mele 2004, Matten and Moon 2004).5   Corporate managers often 
understand the concept differently from policymakers, scholars, and civil 
society activists. Business people, for example, say that profit is not 
inconsistent with the achievement of social aims.  Many NGOs, by contrast, 
say that CSR goals should be pursued regardless of their effects on profit.  
There are therefore many different understandings of the overarching 
concept of CSR. In philosophy, this lack of a single definition is called ‘concept 
contestability’ (Gallie 1956). The philosopher Walter Gallie in the late 1950s 
introduced this idea to refer to disagreement on notions commonly used in 
philosophy, notions such as ‘fairness,’ ‘freedom,’ or ‘democracy.’ There is 
agreement on the abstract meaning of these notions, but disagreement on their 
applications. Recently, scholars in the fields of sociology, economics, political 
science, and management have applied Gallie’s theory to the notion of CSR 
(see among others Moon 2008 and Okoye 2009).  
Gallie’s contribution is unfortunately not one that can be automatically 
assumed, as the meaning of essential contestability is itself controversial. It is 
not clear whether essential contestability means intractable disagreement on the 
use of abstract concepts, or the fact that the disagreement is located at the core 
of the concept and not in its use.6 This is not the place for dealing with the 
dispute extensively but, for example, the philosopher and legal scholar Jeremy 
Waldron (2002) argues that the adjective essential in Gallie’s argument refers to 
the impossibility to identify a core in abstract concepts. By contrast, his 
colleague Ronald Dworkin (1986) reads ‘essentially contested’Raw as referred 
to competing accounts of the same concept. In this essay I endorse the last 
view and argue that, in the case of CSR, the problem is not the essential 
                                                 
4 I follow Rawls’s use of “idea” as defined in Political Liberalism: “I use ‘ideas’ as the 
more general term and as covering both concepts and conceptions.” (Rawls 1992: 14) 
5 Adaeze Okoye (2009) provides a thorough and up to date overview of the main 
theories of CSR, and the terminology used to refer to the concept. 
6 Gallie introduced the attribute of essential contestability out of the dissatisfaction for 
the usual stances held on philosophical questions. Stances commonly assumed are of 
dogmatism —my answer is right, the others are wrong— or of scepticism — all the 
answers have the same weight for nothing definitive can be argued on normative 
matters. Built to solve a problem, the argument gives rise to new ones. 
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contestability of the concept in itself but the distance between the core concept 
and the applications, or use we make of it.7  
CSR concept is broad, vague, and slippery. When we talk about concepts, 
we do not need a complete account of what they comprise and exclude in 
order to agree on their general meaning. When we discuss freedom, equality, 
justice, and other fundamental socio political ideas we tend to recognise what 
we are talking about because we share a general understanding of these abstract 
concepts. It is when we attempt to refer these general ideas to particular 
phenomena that problems begin. 
The contrast between concept and conception is… a contrast between levels of 
abstraction…At the first level agreement collects around discrete ideas that are 
uncontroversially employed in all interpretations; at the second level the 
controversy latent in this abstraction is identified and taken up (Dworkin 1986: 
70-71).8 
And John Rawls, summarising the problem at the beginning of Political 
Liberalism, says: “People can agree on the meaning of the concept … and still 
be at odds…” (Rawls 1992: 14).  
In this paper I am not going to show how Gallie’s theory works in the 
case of CSR concept—Okeye (2009) does it already quite successfully in a 
recent article. I am going to assume the concept/conception distinction does 
apply to CSR, and use this distinction to discover the conceptual core that 
precedes the different understanding of CSR.9 
A series of dichotomies identify the main contrasting understandings of 
CSR: 
 
Voluntary vs. non-voluntary  
Soft law vs. hard law 
Governance vs. government 
Business actors vs. non-business actors 
Product of neo-liberalism vs. Reaction to neo-liberalism 
 
On the left side we find attributes that associate CSR with voluntarism, 
soft law, ‘governance’, business actors, and neoliberalism. On the right side we 
find attributes that associate CSR also with enforcement, hard law, ‘government’, 
non-business actors, and reactions against neo-liberalism. I want to argue here 
not for either side of this dichotomy, but rather that neither the left nor right 
side fully captures the limits and potentials of CSR. We need, instead, to move 
                                                 
7 For those interested in a closer overview of the two positions, John Rawls addresses 
the concept/conception problem in A Theory of Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism 
(1992); Jeremy Waldron (2002) and Abbey (2005) also apply Gallie’s argument; the 
former to law and the latter to liberalism. 
8 I am here drawing mainly on Fred D’Agostino’s account (1996). In his Free Public 
Reason the political philosopher offers a synthetic and exhaustive review of the 
difference between concept and conception (D’Agostino 1996: 15-21). 
9 For a similar application of the concept/conception distinction to liberalism, see 
Sartori (2004). 
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beyond these dichotomies to reveal the nuances in the relationship between 
economy and politics, states and markets, public and private actors, or hard 
and soft law. 
As anticipated in the introduction, the view defended here is that CSR is 
worth investigation for the old concerns regarding our social life on a shared 
and finite planet it brings back. These concerns are expressed by the 
relationship between states, markets, and civil society, and not captured by any 
of the three by itself. For this reason, it is more appropriate to talk about 
“public policies” for CSR, rather than just of measures of CSR.  
Underlining this policy dimension means to acknowledge that 
contributions to the end of responsible behaviour in the market sphere come 
from different actors and are affected by different variables, both institutional 
and informal. Crane (2008) talks of a variety of drivers of CSR, including civil 
society, local communities, managers, government, investors and consumers. 
State and non-state actors are both involved in CSR; soft aspects (managerial 
and decisional styles, local cultures, implicit codes, incentives) matter as much 
as hard laws and state regulations. The core of CSR is to be found at the 
intersection, or better in the continuum, of the public and private spheres; 
politics and markets; individuals and organizations; hard codes and soft law. 
The view here defended is that in none of these pairs one of the two sides is 
irresistibly virtuous or vicious.  
The attribute “public” referred to policy for CSR is to be read in two ways. 
On the one hand, it emphasis the role of governmental bodies as a driver of 
social responsible behaviour in economic activities – a role exercise either 
directly, through initiatives addressed to firms, or indirectly by enabling other 
actors’ initiatives. On the other hand, ‘public’ refers to the quality of the 
problems — problems that are of collective concerns and the solutions of 
which require coordinated efforts by different actors. In either senses public as a 
modifier of policy does not imply that governments are, or should be the main 
authors of the initiatives.10 
3   On old concerns, analogies, and metaphors 
Before proceeding, I want to underline two critical statements that summarise 
the nature of my argument: 
 
1. CSR is interesting because it deals with old and intertwining moral, political, and 
economic concerns.  
                                                 
10 Yet it does imply that governments should play a role in them and therefore share 
part of the responsibility with business and other non-state actors. Many recent 
contributions on the topic of CSR go in this direction and recognise government as 
one of the driversYet it does imply that governments should play a role in them and 
therefore share part of the responsibility with business and other non-state actors. 
Many recent contributions on the topic of CSR go in this direction and recognise 
government as one of the drivers of CSR. See for example Fox (2002); Moon (2002, 
2008); Vogel (2005); Albareda et al. (2008); Neal (2008), Steurer (2009); Epstein, 
(2009). 
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2. The relation between politics and the market that lies at the core of CSR can be 
better understood if we master analogies and metaphors 
 
I am aware that these statements need to be made more clear, which is 
what hopefully this essay will do. But since they are the main pillars11 on which 
my argument stands – and they answer the crucial question “what is this paper 
about?” – I would like to spend some words to introduce them.  
The two statements summarise both the object and the argumentative 
strategy of this paper. They are strictly related and in this argument have the 
same weigh. My story could not be told missing one of two. The first 
statement refers to what makes CSR worth investigating. CSR is interesting 
because it brings our attention back to important, enduring concerns and 
offers the occasion to rethink the relation between politics and the market.  
Depending on the theory we hold — and before this, depending on the 
world view we favour — we will use different attributes to qualify this relation. 
Different views of politics and markets correspond to different ways of 
distinguishing or assimilating the two parts of the relation. These ways, though, 
have at least one thing in common: they all address the boundary between the 
two parts of the relation, the limits between ‘the market and the forum’ (Elster 
1986). The attributes we use to qualify the boundary—e.g. sharp, impermeable, 
fix, shifting, dissolving or fading— reveal something of the way we interpret 
the relation between the parts this boundary identify. 12  Shamir (2008), for 
example, talks about dissolving boundary between politics and the market; 
Brown (2006) about erosion of the boundary, Elster (1986) wants to recover a 
sharp boundary between politics and economy. As we move on an imaginary 
continuum between the two extremes of impermeable limits and fading ones, 
something happens to the two parts of the analogy. We move from a 
maximum of non - relation to a situation in which the two parts dissolve into 
one another. 
The last considerations bridge us to the second statement about the 
importance of mastering analogies and metaphors in order to discuss the 
relation between the market and politics.  
The analogy between politics and the market is accurate provided we do 
two things. First we need to reverse it to take account of the fact that it is not 
politics that looks—better, should look— like the market, but the other way 
round. Neoclassical economic and political thought is characterised by a strong 
normative assumption about the virtue of the market. The neoclassical view is 
described, especially by its supporters, as a realistic account of politics. But in 
fact neoclassical views recommend rather than simply describe. The 
recommendation is that politicians and citizens should behave like sellers and 
consumers and give up any ‘romance’ about the capacity of politics to rescue 
                                                 
11 I chose the image of the pillars thinking more about Ken Follett’s trade book title, 
than about European Commission’s vocabulary. 
12 For a recent contribution on attributes and theories of the boundaries in the age of 
globalisation, see Canale (2009). 
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the market and correct injustice.13 Yet in the market as in politics, private 
preferences and choices either contribute to or detract from collective good. Politics 
here identifies the conditions of the social life, the space of shared ends and 
suitable means to achieve them. In this sense, the market, as the sphere of 
economic activities is not divorced from politics, but strictly linked to it. As a 
matter of the fact ‘the forum’ included ‘the market,’ the place they where 
located in the city was the same in ancient Rome. 
Second, we need to discuss the nature and location of the boundary 
between the two terms of the analogy, ‘market’ and ‘politics.’ This boundary 
marks distinct but related parts. And this is, I think, the account that better 
represents the actual relation between politics and the market and that is more 
appropriate to improve our societies. Differently from authors talking about 
dissolving boundary, what I want to underline is that if the market overflows 
politics it is because the boundary that is supposed to shape their relationship 
needs to be redrawn. The boundary has been changing for as long as the entire 
human history as a consequence of changing ideas about individuals and 
society and of structural dynamics.  
Accepting the analogy and accepting the boundary between markets and 
politics implies rethinking the relationship between the political and the 
economic sphere and the roles of different actors— both public and non-
public— in it. 
4   Freedom and responsibility in the Market and in 
Politics 
I am going to look more closely at the analogy between markets and politics. 
This allows me to address directly the neoclassical view of economic and 
political choices.14 Furthermore, analogy as a rhetorical figure is still 
appropriate to describe the relation between politics and markets, a relation in 
which the two terms look to some extent alike, but are not identical. As the 
philosopher Hilary Putnam reminds us speaking of the facts/values relation, 
                                                 
13 To grasp the normative nuance of neoclassical view of economics and politics see 
for examples William Riker’s account of democracy in Liberalism against Populism 
(1982), or James Buchanan’s account of politics failures, in “Public Choice. Politics 
without romance” (2003). For a criticism of the value assumptions of neoclassical 
economics see Wendy Brown: “Part of what makes neo-liberalism “neo” is that it 
depicts free markets, free trade and entrepreneurial rationality as achieved and 
normative, as promulgated through law and through social and economic policy — 
not simply as occurring by dint of nature” (Brown 2006: 694). 
14 Other theory of economics has smoothed the reductionism of neoclassical view of 
individual preferences as given, for example underlining the relevance of motivations 
and intentions other than self-interest in importance of the setting of choice. There is 
for example a stream of “revisionist public choice.” “the mainstream public choice 
position is one that emphasizes a relatively narrow conception of self-interest as 
motivating choice in the political as well as the economic domain.  By contrast, 
revisionist public choice theory seeks to move away from the strict conception of homo 
economicus, and this movement operates in several dimensions.” (Brennan and Hamlin, 
2008: 2; Christiano, 2004). 
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what counts in analogies are differences more than similarities (Putnam 2002). 
In the style of Putnam, I argue about the appropriateness of sweeping away the 
dualism between politics and the market, which does not mean to rule out the 
distinction between the two. 
The analogy between politics and the market is a core component of the 
neoclassical view of political and economic choices. The analogy is usually 
criticized by opponents of neoclassical economics for reducing politics to the 
aggregation of self-interested preferences. By contrast, I think this analogy is 
valid, but in the other direction. 
Politics, as the space of shared objectives and concerns, is composed of 
moral sentiments, principles, and values that go beyond questions of mere self-
fulfilment. But this is equally true of the market. Thinkers such as Adam Smith, 
John Stuart Mill and, more recently, Amartya Sen are both moral philosophers 
and economists, because they investigate the relationship between moral 
sentiment and the distribution of wealth and other public goods. In the 
thought of these philosophers, the notions of ‘self-interest’ and ‘freedom’ have 
a broader meaning than is often acknowledged. Classical economics, at its 
offspring and in its contemporary versions, holds that moral, political and 
economic concerns are inextricable.  
Adam Smith similarly to his contemporary philosophy confrêres, Scottish 
and French, unveils the irresistible link between economic and politics. In both 
his major works, Smith argues for the connection between political and 
economic freedom, which is closer to Smith ideas about political justice than 
any apology of markets wisdom, as it has been underlined recently by 
economic historians (Rothschild 1992; Walsh 2000).  
Unfortunately the contribution of Smith the radical thinker, the friend of 
Hume and Voltaire, was obscured by his first biographer Dugald Stewart. In 
his attempt to defend himself from prosecution and Smith’s name from 
ostracism, Stewart was indeed successful. Smith shifted from being a 
revolutionary scholar, at least until mid 1790s, to being the conservative 
philosopher of economic freedom and established institutions (Rothschild 
1992: 75).  
Vivian Walsh’s rescue of Smith as a moral and political thinker focuses on 
the notions of self-interest and freedom. Walsh (2000) underlines how Smith’s 
self-interest is not captured by present aims or goals, but it requires taking into 
account all our foreseeable future needs. As Walsh puts it, according to Smith 
true self-interest, differently from simplified and reductive versions of it, 
requires focusing on life-long interests as opposed to present aims (Walsh 
2000: 10).  
Self-interest so interpreted comprises a strong moral and political 
dimension, besides the economic one. Such dimension is at stake when 
individuals deal with concerns that are broader in space and time than the 
fulfilment of particularistic, short-term, or raw desires. In Smith and classical 
economics, we find an entanglement between economic facts and moral 
values, rather than a sharp dichotomy. According to Walsh, Sen has rescued 
Smith from the neoclassical view of self-interest as gross, short terms self-
indulgence (Walsh 2000: 11). And in fact, Sen’s capability approach is derived, 
as Sen himself points out, from Smith. In Sen’s reinterpretation of poverty as 
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lack of capability rather than lack of income, as inability to function in a certain 
society, the moral, the political and the economic concerns are inextricable.  
There is nothing new in claiming that economy has always been political. 
Economy has to do with the construction and survival of societies, and the 
well-being of its individuals. The contemporary globalized world unveils this 
strict connection and calls our attention once again on the relationship 
between politics and the market. 
In his homonymous essay Jon Elster criticizes the analogy between “the 
market and the forum” that wants to reduce choices in the forum to choices in 
the private market arena (self-interested, affecting only the chooser). Elster 
defends a more demanding view of politics than the neo-classical view of 
rational choice theorists. I follow Elster in his critique of neo-classical 
economics, but I depart from him when I argue that the analogy should be 
maintained and reversed to explore normative and policy implications of the 
relationship between markets and politics, between markets and morality.  
The idea of CSR has the merit of encouraging such a reversion of the 
analogy. It challenges us to rethink the interaction among state, markets and 
civil society and the role of different actors in it. The two terms of the analogy 
– politics and the market – are distinct but they present similarities. Actors’ 
moral responsibility is implied when they act in the market as in politics. 
Choices in the market – consumers’ choices, producers’ choices – similarly 
choices in politics have to do with the good of third parties.  
Reversing the analogy between politics and economy enables us to gain a 
deeper understanding of the notions of freedom and responsibility as political 
rather than merely economic. Emphasis on freedom and responsibility is often 
seen as the product of neoliberal emphasis on private solutions to public 
problems. As politics retreats in failure or impotence, market mechanisms of 
regulation advance, and with them emphasis on voluntary economic 
behaviours.  
Critics of neoliberalism often extend their suspicion towards neo-liberal 
political logic and intentions, to the very ideas of freedom and responsibility 
that accompany it. But this suspicion rests on a fundamental misunderstanding 
of freedom and responsibility. The pursuit of one’s self-interest is not freedom 
at least not as it is conceived in either classical or contemporary political 
liberalism. Freedom is not the same in neoliberalism and liberalism, which 
represent two very different views of politics and economy.  
In the terms of classical liberalism, focus on market choice is just as likely 
to endanger individual freedom, as it is to realize it. When citizens approach 
political decisions as they approach houses or cars, as the neoliberal view of 
politics would suggest, they give up the task of evaluating political institutions. 
By contrast, classical liberalism emphasizes the responsibility of citizens to act 
and choose in the public interest. In classical liberalism, unlike in neoliberalism, 
freedom is a demanding concept. The core meaning of freedom we find in 
Locke, Kant, Smith, and John Mill is the freedom to check and remove 
illegitimate power in the private, as well as the in public sphere. It is not merely 
to assert private interests or ownership. Freedom, in classical liberalism, means 
responsibility at its higher degree. Freedom may become so explicitly demanding 
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in certain liberal accounts that some critics have referred to it as “self-tyranny” 
(Berlin 1969). 15 
5   CSR: neoliberal or liberal? 
CSR is based on this demanding notion of freedom and responsibility. CSR 
refers to mechanisms of voluntary, autonomous behavioural control. It echoes 
the account of freedom and responsibility of classical liberalism, not of 
neoliberalism. Freedom is control over one’s choices achieved through rational 
scrutiny, evaluation of the quality of the actors’ interests and desires in the light 
of their impact on third parties — for example the chooser itself in the future, 
the rest of the planet, or future generations. 
Since it is neoliberalism not liberalism that is usually referred to in the 
debate on CSR, I would like to say some words to distinguish the two.  
Liberalism is a theory of politics and society, and therefore also an economic 
theory. It includes social contract theorists such as Locke and Kant, and quasi-
utilitarian ones as Mill.16By contrast, neoliberalism is what political theorist 
Wendy Brown calls an “impure” version of classical economic liberalism 
(Brown, 2006: 694). This ‘impurity’ rests in the neoliberal requirement that 
states support markets through laws and policies, but do not interfere in 
matters of wealth distribution. In neoliberalism, the criteria of productivity, 
efficiency, and profitability are substitutes for the juridical criteria that otherwise 
govern the sphere of politics (Brown 2006: 693-696).  
In criticising neo-liberalism, it is important to address the interplay 
between facts and values. On the one hand, the shift from ‘government’ to so-
called ‘governance,’ from top-down to diffused authority, results from certain 
unavoidable facts: welfare states are overstretched, governments are 
increasingly indebted, inefficient, and ineffective in dealing with social 
problems. But the choice of where to spend and where to cut—where to interfere 
and where to retreat—is a matter of value priorities, not just ‘facts.’ And about 
this interplay between facts and values, it is interesting to note, together with 
Brown, how in neo-liberal times corporate responsibility became the 
“watchword” of both left liberals and neo-conservatives. Supposedly animated 
by very different motives, both parts lament the emptiness of moral meaning 
that characterizes free market capitalism (Brown 2006). Both sides invoke CSR 
to moralize the market. Other readings of the current neo-liberal times, 
underline the dark side of the “the moralization of the market,” and call CSR a 
product of neo-liberalism, and not a reaction to it.  
Roner Shamir, for example, analyses this moralization as one of the two 
processes that characterize the shift from government to governance. The 
market assumes direct responsibility for issues traditionally confined to politics, 
as politics progressively abdicates its tasks of regulation and control, to assume 
                                                 
15 On this point, see Isaiah Berlin’s famous reading of Kant’s and Mill’s instable 
positions between Locke and Rousseau in Two concepts of liberty (1969). 
16 On the eccentricity of Mill, see Mill on Liberty. A defence, by John Gray. See also Gray 
(1983) for an historical and philosophical account of liberalism, and my “Think 
liberalism?” on different conceptions of liberalism as a political theory (Lebano 2009). 
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the more sustainable role of partner for other private sources of authorities 
(‘the economization of politics’) (Shamir 2008). The result of the two 
combined processes is a morality that has lost its normative and prescriptive 
character to turn into business opportunity. A morality so embedded in the 
market so as to become ‘toothless.’  
Brown and Shamir provide a good example of criticism ‘from within’ and 
‘from outside.’17 The two critiques are very similar in their premises and focus, 
yet Brown’s critique of neo-liberalism ‘from within’ is more accurate than the 
more widespread critiques from outside, in Shamir’s style. To anticipate the 
argument of those pointing at the risk of being partisan in criticizing what is 
too close to us, I will only underline that distance in itself does not make us 
better critics (Walzer 2002). Tendentious account of our adversaries’ thoughts 
and behaviours are at least as frequent as the accounts vitiated by excess of 
indulgence for what we care about. But I think that the danger on 
oversimplifying foes’ theories is more pernicious for at least two reasons. First, 
because it is a closer risk — we tend to think that the so-called critical distance 
is a safer path to good criticism. Second, because it both diminishes the fair-
play of the knowledge enterprise and weakens our arguments. How much 
theoretical value has the defeat of a hopeless theory? I am aware, of course, 
that for scholars who are not saints, the temptation is great.  
We would like things to be either black or white, but the ‘morality of the 
market’ is too nuanced for this. The interplay between market, politics, and 
morality requires us to make distinctions and find similarities, for example 
distinguishing between liberalism and neoliberalism when we talk about large 
concepts like freedom, justice, and, indeed, ‘corporate social responsibility.’ 
CSR is therefore useful because it challenges us to question dichotomies and 
easy labels.18 
In the last section I will address another important dichotomy that 
characterises the debate on CSR: the opposition between voluntary and hard 
regulation. I will then link this dichotomy to the unresolved question of the 
divide between means and ends in politics. 
6   Soft and hard law, means and ends. Walking the line 
The divide between hard and soft laws is echoed in the dispute over voluntary 
versus non–voluntary measures as the appropriate means to foster social 
responsible behaviour. Because CSR refers to a relation between public and 
private actors characterised by the shift from the logic of linear top-down 
authority to diffused horizontal network of authorities, it questions the 
                                                 
17 For the distinction between criticism ‘from outside’ and criticism “from within,” see 
Michael Walzer’s argument in The Company of Critics (1998, second edition 2002) and 
Nadia Urbinati’s distinction between ‘radical criticism’ and ‘criticism from within’ 
(Urbinati 2009). 
18 In many cases unsound adversary attitude does not help. The label CSR is used as 
much by left and by right critics of neo-liberalism; Kant and Mill are theorists of 
negative liberty, as much as the far-too-liberal Locke, but at the same time they 
embrace positive liberty, just as the not-exactly-liberal Rousseau. 
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discontinuity between hard and soft law, and the supposed superiority of the 
first. 
Generally speaking, soft law refers to mechanisms of regulations the 
normativity of which does not rely on binding rules and sanctions. By contrast, 
hard law refers to the regulations proceeding from the state in its legislative 
function (Di Robilant, 2006: 499).  
On the specific issue of voluntary against non-voluntary measures of CSR, 
we can identify two extreme positions: the enthusiasts of soft laws as opposed 
to the sceptics of it and defenders of hard codes. The enthusiasts hold soft law 
to be flexible, modest and tailored on real problems, and hard law to be slow, 
expensive and distant from real problems and feasible solutions.19 By contrast, 
the sceptics lament its lack of coherence, accountability and democracy, as well 
as effectiveness. At the same time they underline the distinctiveness and 
superiority of hard law and the danger of shortening the distance between the 
two.20 The suspicion against soft law rises partly because of the special place 
that the legislative power occupies in liberal-democracy as defence against 
arbitrary power — not just illegitimate state power, but the power of any 
stronger part over weaker ones. Arguments in favour of soft law are therefore 
opposed because they appear to downsize the relevance of the rule of law by 
claiming the efficacy and legitimacy of other form of regulations.  
I proposed to look closer at the two positions to better grasp their 
connections with the other dichotomies that we saw characterizing the concept 
of CSR. I will first continue with a “dramatized” account of the contrasting 
aspects, in order to set the problem. In the development of my argument 
nuances within each side should emerge.  
For the enthusiasts of voluntarism and soft law, the path goes roughly 
from recognising the moral responsibility of economic actors, to claiming that 
binding regulations would endanger this responsibility. In making the danger 
explicit, they refers to matters of principles (responsible behaviour cannot be 
imposed, it must be spontaneously endorsed, or it would cease being 
responsible) and to matters of facts (command-and control measures are 
expensive and ineffective). By contrast, the sceptics of voluntary measures who 
defend hard codes appeal to coherence, certainty and democracy, which hard 
law has and soft law lacks. They cite the proliferation of self-imposed and self-
monitored codes of conduct of dubious effects to ground their opposition to 
soft-law and voluntarism in facts, and not just theoretical and moral tastes 
(Neal 2008, Epstein 2009, Vogel 2005). Yet a different line of criticism of the 
                                                 
19 Anna Di Robilant distinguishes between a “neo-medievalist” and a “social 
genealogy” of soft law, both underlining the merits of soft law. In the author’s words, 
the fist genealogy depicts soft law as “the ideal tool for strengthening the European 
market, eliminating the obstacles resulting from the diversity of national laws and 
responding to the actual needs and demands of the business community.” The second 
genealogy underlines “soft law pluralistic dimension and social potential” (De 
Robilant, 2006: 502-503). 
20 See for example J. Klabbers, “The Redundancy of Soft Law,” in «Nordic Journal of 
International Law», 65, 1996, pp. 167-182; J.J. Kirton, M.J. Trebilcock (eds.), Soft Law 
and the Elusive Quest for Sustainable Global Governance, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2004. For a 
critical assessment of the sceptic position, see Pariotti (2009). 
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soft-hard law divide moves beyond these two extreme views and claims for 
redrawing the line between hard and soft, on the basis of theoretical and 
empirical arguments.  
The legal scholar Gralf-Peter Calliess, for example, addresses the 
conditions for crossing the line between hard and soft law in global 
governance regimes. As a matter of fact, global governance regimes, he argues, 
often pass this line as they are based both on hard law and social norms and 
have the potential and legitimacy to swing from soft to hard codes (Calliess 
2009: 273). Calliess identifies two conditions for the shift from soft to hard 
law. First, soft law must provide an impartial dispute-resolution procedure; 
second, it must save a memory of past decisions. The first condition refers to 
the possibility of resolving a dispute about what is legal versus what is illegal by 
means of a third party, just like in the case of hard law. The second condition 
refers to the mechanism to stabilize normative expectations of a society. Hard 
law enables people not to relinquish their expectations about what is 
legal/illegal, even when the expectations are not fulfilled in a specific case. 
According to Calliess, legal systems can evolve through the aid of other forms 
of regulations, providing these regulations satisfy the two conditions.  
This evolution, the author argues, it already taking place, because  when 
hard codes fail to succeed in behaviour control or dispute resolution, due for 
example to their formalism, alternative mechanisms take their place. Some of 
these mechanisms compete with hard law both at performance (the first 
condition for trespassing the line) and at function level (the second condition 
for trespassing the line from social norms to law). The author cites lex 
mercatoria and internet regulations as examples of regulations that go beyond 
the hard vs. soft dichotomy by fulfilling both the conditions. While other 
regulations, such as CSR, competes with hard law only at the level of 
performance.  
CSR in Calliess’s account is an example of how corporate behaviour can 
be regulated by social norms. CSR is a governance mechanism that competes 
with hard codes in performing behavioural control, but not as alternative 
dispute resolution. The irresponsible behaviour is sanctioned by public opinion 
and not by the state. CSR is defined as codes of conduct voluntarily adopted 
by companies to commit themselves to social and environmental responsible 
behaviour. CSR guidelines are not directly legally binding, so they cannot be 
used to resolve conflicts, yet they can be a means for producing social pressure 
that in the long run will produce changes (Calliess 2009: 271-273). Public self-
commitment to responsible behaviour becomes an effective means for change 
because publicity is directly linked to accountability.  
Robert Goodin provides a similar statement about the link between 
publicity and accountability, and the normative force of mechanisms that do 
not rely on sanctions other than bad publicity and public embarrassment. He 
criticises the scepticism of what he calls ‘hobbesian realpolitik tradition’ 
towards ‘toothless’ accountability mechanism (Goodin 1992: 135). Sceptics’ 
objection is that obligation to tell publicly a good story — a story of good 
management, or of environmentally responsible public procurement — is not a 
sufficient constraint to irresponsible behaviour. Conversely, Goodin argues not 
just theoretically, but on the bases of cases, that being exposed to public shame 
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may actually induce people to internalise moral norms, to be become 
accountable. After all, what is today’s law was yesterday social norm, 
encouraging or discouraging certain behaviours (See also Epstein 2009 on the 
same point). Yet the passage between soft and hard may as well proceeds in 
the opposite direction, from hard codes to soft codes and social norms. But in 
this case hard code should not retreat even though they have been interiorised. 
A retreat of hard code to leave space to soft code, would be like saying that 
after have been punishing the homicide of an unfaithful wife as a crime for 
decades, we can now rely on the interiorization of the hard code we can stop 
sending uxoricides to prison and count, instead, on public shame. Besides the 
above provocation, a way to argue in favour of maintaining hard code even in 
those situations in which the rules have been interiorised is that keeping the 
law in place is both effective and efficient. Hard codes are still good incentives 
not to misbehave and when fewer and fewer people do misbehave they are also 
quite cheap.  
A further argument of the sceptics of soft law, as I mentioned at the 
beginning of the section, underlines its uncertainty and the evanescence of its 
boundaries, but mostly, its lack of democratic legitimacy. Who are the 
extensors of soft law and why should we trust them to work in the interest of 
responsible behaviours in the market or in politics? According to this line of 
critique, state laws should be overriding because they are legitimately produced 
through democratic mechanisms. In this view, supporters of soft laws need to 
answer two main questions: what are the criteria for regulations to be soft 
laws? What is the relation between soft law and democracy? (Pariotti 2009)  
Concerning the first question and the problem of the criteria, authors who 
defend continuity between hard and soft law, hold that these criteria should 
balance between strictness and flexibility. They should not be too strict, in 
order to avoid a state-centric views. And they should not be too loose and 
inclusive, in order to avoid that any social, economic, cultural pressure or 
practice results in a norm. The objective in this case is to find the right balance 
between hard and soft modes of juridical normativity (Pariotti 2009).  
Concerning the second question and the problem of democracy and soft 
law, the matter under discussion is how the spread of soft law affects 
democracy. Some authors have underlined that we can reconcile self-regulating 
behaviour of non-state actors with democratic legitimacy once we redefine 
democracy and move beyond a merely procedural conception and closer to 
forms of participatory and reflective democracy (Mertus 1999). Thoughts and 
critiques to democracy, Mertus underlines, are triggered by the contemporary 
state of affairs characterized by globalisation and neo-liberal devaluation of 
democracy and legal standards in favour of privatization of authority and rules.  
Some of these critiques claim for de-politicization in favour of deliberation 
(Pettit 2004, 2003; Elster 1986). Others instead claim for more participatory— 
democracy from below (Mertus 1999, Brown 2006, Urbinati 2010). There is a 
thin line between the two criticisms to procedural democracy, but this is not 
surprising, since both criticisms build on Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s political 
theory.  
The first line of criticism calls for less democracy (in the sense of majority 
decisions) and more rational deliberation through dedicated bodies of citizens. 
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It refers to Rousseau as the father of consensual and deliberative democracy, 
rather than of majoritarianism.21 The ISO 26000 standards of social 
responsibility, for example, may be seen as the results of a non democratic, but 
deliberative setting of decision. The second line of criticism calls for more 
democracy, but of a different kind—democracy from below as opposed to 
institutionalised representative democracy, and appeal to Rousseau’s idea of 
democracy as self-government. In her appeal to “doing democracy differently.” 
This appeal to democracy of a different kind could be an argument to defend 
the actions of NGOs against the accusation of being illegitimated because not 
democratically elected. On this regards, Mertus argues that strict conditions of 
participation, transparency and accountability should be in place and they 
should include national and trans-national civil society, in order to substantially 
improve democracy and its processes.22 I would add that strict conditions are 
required also to avoid that substantive, participatory democracy translates into 
appeals to the “will of all” of a bad populist kind. Rousseau himself was careful 
in distinguishing the “general will” from the “will of all.” The first is the will of 
the people when they are deliberating for the general, and not for the 
particularistic good, on the basis of their considered judgments, and not just 
raw self-interests. The second is the mere aggregation of the votes of 
contingent majorities.23 
The heterogeneity of thoughts and criticisms that characterises ideas and 
practices of democracy challenges those who defend the continuity between 
hard and soft law. The dichotomy between binding and non-binding normative 
tools, according to many authors, loses importance. The so-called soft law is 
after all still based on standards, it has a system of accountability, and it is 
effective in filling the gaps of hard law (Pariotti 2009: 101). Its informality and 
bottom-up character is argued to take better into account the cultural 
specificities that influence the respects of the norms. What prevents soft law 
from becoming a legitimate normative tool is a still dominant positivistic idea 
of law.24 
In this view, rather than worrying for the lack of democratic legitimacy, we 
should engage with more substantial conceptions of democracy. Because, 
Pariotti continues, it is time to move beyond the dichotomy between a world in 
which juridical community and political community overlap via the rule of law 
and one in which norms are produced by private actors and the civil society. 
The dichotomy does not represent the current state of the world in which law 
                                                 
21 This is a difference that both critics from the left and from the right omit to 
underline. Radical left critics share one of their dearest dichotomies (the Locke vs. 
Rousseau one) with their neoliberal foes, even though they stand on opposite sides of 
the boundary. For an account of Rousseau’s duality, see Gaus (1997), Burgio (1989), 
Cohen (1986) and my “Is Rawls a populist? Liberalism and ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
populism,” MPSA-Paper, Chicago 2009. 
22 On the role of civil society, voluntary associations as a key too improve democratic 
states, see Joshua Cohen’s and Joel Rogers’s article in Associations and Democracy: the real 
utopias project (1995). 
23 On the fundamentals of the social contract, not majority but consensus is requires. 
Rousseau ([1762] 1973). 
24 On this point see also Calliess and Renner (2009). 
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becomes autonomous from nation-states and their politics and subjected to the 
influence of other actors and dynamics (e.g. business and civil society actors 
and economics dynamics) (Pariotti, 2009: 104). Pariotti does not argue that law 
is arbitrary, as post-modern conceptions of law do, but that it has a rationality 
that precedes and overcomes nation state boundaries. Governing is no longer 
an exclusive prerogative of nation-states in the age of governance, when the 
capacity of governing has been dispersed among a wide range of state, non-
state and transnational actors.25 This may as well be the case, but the way we 
manage the shift from procedural to substantial ideals and practices of 
democracy, and bridge the gap between government and governance still 
makes a difference. The link between means and ends is a crucial one, either 
when discussing ideals of democracy, or when defending tools of regulations in 
times of governance.  
CSR seems based on the idea that soft law is better than hard law. Rules, 
regulations, and codes seem more and more autonomous from nation-states 
and their politics, more and more subjected to the influence of other actors 
and more voluntary dynamics (for example, business and civil society actors 
and economics dynamics). Voluntarism and autonomous regulations are 
therefore key aspects of the concept of CSR. But, returning to the distinction 
with which I began, do these ideas refer to the concept of CSR, or are they 
merely one conception of it?  
Voluntarism, I think, does not lie at the core of CSR concept. Voluntarism 
is not related to CSR’s ends, but rather to its means. Yet CSR is not only about 
means, or particular measures, but also about ends: fair distribution of rights and 
resources in the interests of each and every person. Voluntary or non-
voluntary, narrow or broad, neo-liberal or left-liberal readings of CSR all have 
to do with conceptions, not with the core concept. The concept of CSR has to do 
with ends. Behaving in a responsible way in the economic sphere, when 
producing, distributing, consuming goods, or when dealing with the waste 
generated by consumer society, requires hard as well as soft regulations. 
Voluntary as well as non-voluntary measures are both appropriate, depending 
on the institutional setting, quality of existing laws, and the kinds of 
relationships between state and non-state actors that exist in particular places. 
7   Conclusions: What’s in a name? 
There are views that contrast states and markets and consider them two worlds 
apart. Holders of these views, in some cases, stretch the politics and the market 
opposition to the point that they hope one of the two worlds absorbs and 
cancels the other – since genuine non-interference appears to be neither 
feasible nor desirable. Adversarial views of politics and the market are held 
both by apologists and castigators of the markets. My argument started not just 
from the dissatisfaction with such views and their Manichaeism. In this essay I 
wanted to appreciate that other ways of the relation between politics and the 
                                                 
25 “[t]he essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms which do not 
rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions of governments” (Stoker 1998:17). 
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market are possible. Contributions that investigate these ways are useful to 
improve theory soundness and policy efficacy. 
The prerogative of this kind of reading is that it maintains the boundary 
between markets and politics, while redefining this boundary as a means of 
relation, exchange, and coordination. Boundaries and limits, are not merely 
barriers that prevent expression and communication, they are, to use Kant’s 
insight, enabling conditions.  
When contemporary socio-economical, political or legal scholars talk 
about the flood of the economic into the political sphere, they are describing a 
boundary that seems no longer suitable to shape the exchange between the two 
sides. I think that to question the quality of the boundary – an artificial 
boundary that is still there to be discussed and redesigned – is a more 
important task than claiming for the boundary break to the advantage of either 
the ‘market or the forum.’  
My argument builds on two distinct points. First, ‘politics and market 
analogy’ can be maintained, but should be reversed. Second, the two terms of 
this analogy (as in any analogy) share some features, but are distinct, because 
there is a boundary in place between them. We see this boundary shifting and 
broadening the market or the politics side, depending on contingencies, and 
interests of powerful actors (but also depending on fashionable lines of 
criticism). When we hold a more normative or philosophical view of this 
boundary, we wants to discuss the quality of it, and the justice and well-being 
that it allows or prevents. Once cleared the field from easy adversary attitudes, 
there is something that can be said about how to make the boundary more 
consistent with the current state of affairs and the ends of global justice. 
Social and environmental urgencies, welfare state-overstretch, globalized 
competition, information technology spread, and the multiplication of players 
and rules of governance call theorists and practitioners to think about more 
appropriate limits between the market and politics. Markets and politics are 
distinct, and this distinction is important, but they cannot and should not be 
conceived as alternatives. Discussing the limits means to look for solutions to 
improve their relationship that are both feasible and desirable, and CSR 
policies can be among these solutions.  
I would like to conclude by raising a question: what happens when we 
change the name ‘CSR’? Do we change the name to our conception of CSR, or 
do we change concept? 
Different labels are used to evoke different conceptions of CSR. The label 
renames the concept to make explicit the conception of CSR proposed. This is 
what John Rawls did about the concept of justice, when he named his theory 
“Justice as Fairness.” In other words, the proposition is “CSR as X,” where X 
is the conception we choose to defend, but the subject is still CSR. But it is 
also possible to change concept when changing name. In this case, we might 
change the very name ‘CSR’ because we are abandoning the concept 
altogether. This is what Simone de Beauvoir did about women’s condition, 
when she argued it was not a matter of equality, but of freedom. The 
proposition here becomes “Not CSR, but rather Y,” where Y is some new 
concept, a different subject matter that we think more useful in framing the 
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relationship between market and politics. Both these possibilities demand 
better insight into what the concept of CSR includes and what it excludes.  
In this paper I argued that the concept of CSR has to do with the morality 
of the market—the old entanglement among moral, political and economic 
concerns that has been at the centre of philosophical, economic and political 
theories before the rise of any disciplinary boundary. This is the rediscovery of 
old concerns that CSR puts forward, and in it rests its core, that precedes its 
name. 
References 
ABBEY, R., (2005), “Is liberalism now an essentially contested concept?” New political 
science, 27(4), pp. 461-80. 
ALBAREDA, L., LOZANO, J. M., TENCATI, A., MIDTTUN, A., PERRINI, F. 
(2008), “The changing role of governments in corporate social responsibility: 
drivers and responses,” Business Ethics: A European Review, 17(4), pp. 347-363. 
ALBAREDA L., LOZANO J. M., YSA T. (2007), “Public policies on corporate Social 
Responsibility: The role of governments in Europe,” Journal of Business Ethics, 74, 
pp. 391–407. 
ALBAREDA, L., et al. (2006), “The government’s role in promoting corporate 
responsibility: A comparative analysis of Italy and UK from the relational state 
perspective,” Corporate Governance, 6(4), pp. 386–400. 
ALMEIDA ASHLEY, P. (2010), “Corporate social responsibility: A role only for 
business leader?” Inaugural Address Prince Claus Chair in Development and 
Equity 2009/11. 
BERGER, G., STEURER, R., KONRAD, A., MARTINUZZI, A. (2007), “Raising 
awareness for CSR in EU member states: Overview of government initiatives 
and selected cases,” Final report to the high-level group on CSR. 
BERLIN, I. (1969), Four essays on liberty, Oxford University Press. 
BESUSSI, A. (2006), “La libertà e i suoi puzzles,” SIFP-Italian Association for 
Political Philosophy. 
BREDGAARD, T. (2004), “Corporate social responsibility between public policy and 
enterprise policy,” Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research, 10(3), 372-392. 
BRENNAN, G. and HAMLIN, A. (2008), “Revisionist public choice theory,” New 
Political Economy, 13(1), pp. 77-88. 
BROWN, W. (2006), “American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservativism, and 
De-democratisation,” Political Theory, 34(6), pp. 690-714. 
BUCHANAN, J. (2003), “Public choice. Politics without romance,” Policy, 19(3), 
http://www.cis.org.au/policy/spr03/polspr03-2.htm. 
BURGIO, A. (1989), Eguaglianza, interesse, unanimità, Saggi Bibliopolis, Napoli. 
CALLIESS, G.P. and RENNER, M. (2009), “Between Law and Social Norms: The 
evolution of Global Governance,” Ratio Juris, 22(2), pp. 260-280. 
CANALE, D. (2009), “Muri di confine. trasformazioni dei confini pubblici nell’età 
della globalizzazione,” Ragion Pratica, 33, pp. 378-397. 
CANOVAN, M. (1999), “Trust the People! Populism and the two faces of 
democracy”, Political studies, 47(1), 2-16. 
CARROLL, A. B. (1991), “The pyramid of corporate social responsibility: Toward the 
moral management of organizational stakeholder,” Business Horizons, pp. 39-48. 
 23
CHRISTIANO, T. (2004), “Is Normative Rational Choice Theory Self-Defeating?”, 
Ethics, 115, pp. 122-141. 
COHEN, J. and ROGERS, J.(1995), “Associations and Democracy,” In Wright E.O., 
(Eds), Associations and Democracy: the real utopias project. 
COHEN, J. (1986 ), “An Epistemic Conception of Democracy”, Ethics, 97(1), pp. 26-
38. 
CRANE, A. et al. (2008), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility, Oxford 
University Press, New York. 
D’AGOSTINO, F. (1996), Free public reason. Making it up as we go, Oxford University 
Press, New York. 
DI ROBILANT, A. (2006). “Genealogies of Soft Law,” American Journal of Comparative 
Law, 54, pp.499-554. 
DWORKIN, R. (1986), Law’s empire, Fontana Press, London. 
ELSTER, J. (1989), “The market and the forum,” In Elster, J., and Hylland, A. (Eds.), 
Foundations of social choice theory, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo. 
EPSTEIN, E. M. (2009), “The Good Company,” Ethical Prospects: Economy, Society, and 
Environment, 1, pp. 3-17. 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, (2006). Implementing the partnership for growth and 
jobs: Making Europe a pole of excellence on corporate social responsibility; 
communication from the Commission; COM(2006) 136 final. 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006_0136en01.pd
f.  
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2002), Communication from the Commission 
concerning Corporate Social Responsibility: A business contribution to 
sustainable development, COM (2002) 347(01), July 2002, Brussels: European 
Commission. COM(2002) 347 final. 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/february/tradoc_127374.pdf 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2001), Promoting a European framework for 
corporate social responsibility; Green Paper. 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/publications/2001/ke3701590_en.pdf. 
EUROPEAN COUNCIL (2006), Renewed EU sustainable development strategy; 
10917/06. http://ec.europa.eu/sustainable/docs/renewed_eu_sds_en.pdf. 
EUROPEAN COUNCIL (2000), Presidency conclusions—Lisbon European 
Council, 23 and 24 March 2000, DOC/00/8. 
http://ue.eu.int/en/Info/eurocouncil/index.htm 
FOX, T., WARD H. and HOWARD B. (2002), “Public Sector Roles in Strengthening 
Corporate Social Responsibility: A baseline study,” Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank Group. 
GALLIE, W. B., (1956), “Essentially contested concepts,” Proceeding of the Aristotelian 
Society, 56, pp. 167-198. 
GARRIGA, E., MELE´, D. (2004), “Corporate social responsibility theories: mapping 
the territory,” Journal of Business Ethics, 53, pp. 51-71. 
GOODIN, R. E. (1992), Motivating political morality, Blackwell, Cambridge (MA) 
GRAY,  J. (1986), Liberalism, Open University Press, Suffolk 
GRAY, J. (1983), Mill’s On Liberty. A defence, Routledge, London. 
GAUS, J. 1997), “Does Democracy Reveal the Will of the People? Four Takes on 
Rousseau,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, pp. 141-162. 
KIRTON, J.J. and TREBILCOCK M.J. (2004) (Eds.), Soft Law and the Elusive Quest for 
Sustainable Global Governance, Aldershot, Ashgate,  
 24
KLABBERS, J. (1996), “The Redundancy of Soft Law,” Nordic Journal of International 
Law, 65, pp. 167-182. 
LEBANO, A. (2009), “Thick liberalism?,” In LPF Working Paper Series—Laboratory of 
Comparative Politics and Political Philosophy, Centro Einaudi, Turin. 
LEBANO, A. (2009), “Is Rawls a populist? Liberalism and ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
populism,” MPSA Paper, Chicago, April 2009. 
MERTUS, J. (1999), “Doing democracy ‘differently’: The transformative potential of 
human rights NGOs in transnational civil society,” Third World Legal Studies 1998-
1999. 
MILL, J. S. (1859), On liberty, Henry Holt and Co, New York. 
MOON, J., and MATTEN, D. (2008), “’Implicit’ and ‘explicit’ CSR: A conceptual 
framework for a comparative understanding of corporate social responsibility,” 
Academy of management Review, 33(2), pp. 404-424. 
MOON, J. (2007), “The Contribution of Corporate Social Responsibility to 
Sustainable Development,” Sustainable Development, 15, pp. 296-306. 
MOON, J. (2004), “Government as a Driver of Corporate Social Responsibility,” No. 
20-2004 ICCSR Research Paper Series, International Centre for Corporate Social 
Responsibility. 
MOON, J. (2002), “The social responsibility of business and new governance,” 
Governments and Opposition, 37(3), pp. 385-408 
NEAL, A. C. (2008), “Corporate social responsibility: Governance gain or laissez-faire 
figleaf?” Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, 29(4), pp. 459-474.   
NELSON, J. (2004), “The public role of private enterprise: risks, opportunities, and 
new models of engagement,” Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative - Working Paper 
No. 1, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. 
OKOYE, A. (2009), “Theorizing corporate social responsibility as an essentially 
contested concept: Is a definition necessary?” Journal of Business Ethics, 89, pp. 
613-627. 
OECD. (2008), Overview of selected initiatives and instruments relevant to corporate 
social responsibility. OECD-ILO Conference on Corporate Social Responsibility, 
Paris. 
OECD (2004), “Principles of Corporate Governance,” OECD, Paris 
PARIOTTI, E. (2009), “Soft law e ordine giuridico ultra-statuale tra ‘rule of law’ e 
democrazia,” Ragion Pratica, 32, pp. 88-105. 
PETTIT, P. (2004), “Depoliticizing Democracy,” Ratio Juris, 17, pp. 52-65. 
PETTIT, P. (2003), “Deliberative Democracy, the Discursive Dilemma, and 
Republican Theory, in J. S. Fishkin and P. Laslett (Eds.), Debating Deliberative 
Democracy, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 138-62. 
PUTNAM, H. (2002), The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays, Harvard 
University Press The Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
RAWLS, J. (1992), Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, New York. 
RAWLS, J. (1971), A theory of justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA). 
RIKER, W. H. (1982), Liberalism against populism: A confrontation between the theory of 
democracy and the theory of social choice, W H Freeman & Co, San Francisco. 
ROTHSCHILD, E. (1992), “Adam Smith and conservative economics,” The Economic 
History review, New Series,  45(1), pp. 74-96. 
ROUSSEAU, J. J. ([1762]1973), The Social Contract, In The Social Contract and Discourses, 
trans. G.D.H., Cole, J.M. Dent and Sons, London. 
 25
SARTORI, G. (2004), “Il liberalismo che precede i liberalismi,” Biblioteca della libertà, 1, 
pp. 21-30. 
SEN, A. K. (1993), “Capability and well-being,” In M. Nussbaum and A. K. SEN 
(Eds) The Quality of Life, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 30-53. 
SHAMIR, R. (2008), “Corporate social responsibility: Towards a new market-
embedded morality?” Theoretical Inquires in Law, 9(2), Art. 3, pp. 371-395. 
SMITH, A. ([1776] 1937), The Wealth of Nations, Modern Library Edition, New York. 
SMITH, A. ([1759] 1966), The Theory of Moral Sentiments, August, J. Kelley Publishers, 
New York. 
STEURER, R. (2009), “The role of governments in corporate social responsibility: 
characterizing public policies on CSR in Europe,” Policy Science, 43(1), pp. 49-72. 
STEURER, R., MARGULA, S., BERGER G. (2008), “Public policies on CSR in EU 
Member States: Overview of government initiatives and selected cases on 
Awareness Raising for CSR, Sustainable Public Procurement and Socially 
Responsible Investment,” ESDN Quarterly Reports. 
STOKER, G. (1998), “Governance as Theory: five propositions,” International Social 
Science Journal, 50, pp. 17-28. 
URBINATI, N. (2010), “Unpolitical Democracy,” Political Theory, 38(1), pp. 65-92. 
VOGEL, D. (2005), “The market for virtue. The potential and limits of corporate 
social responsibility,” Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C. 
WALDRON, J. (2002), “Is the rule of law an essentially contested concept (in 
Florida)?” Law and Philosophy, 21, pp. 137-164. 
WALSH, V. (2000), “Smith after Sen,” Review of Political Economy, 12(1), pp. 5-25. 
WALZER, M. ([1998], 2002), The Company of Critics, Basic Books, New York. 
WINDSOR, D. (2006), “Corporate social responsibility – Three key approaches,” 
Journal of Management Studies, 43, pp. 93-114.  
WOLIN, S. ([1960] 2006), Politics and Vision. Continuity and innovation in Western political 
thoughts, Princeton University Press.  
